Introduction
A recent concern in economics is the interplay between income and pollution (see World Bank (1993) ). The main question raised is whether or not continued environmental degradation is a necessary part of the process of industrialization. Will pollution continue to increase without bound as more and more countries pass through the development phase or will it be controlled? (For earlier versions of this, see Malthus (1798) for renewable resources and the Club of Rome report (see Meadows, Meadows and Randers (1972) ) for non-renewable resources). Intuitively, if "clean air" is a normal good, we would expect that societies might be "self-regulating" in the sense that as income increases, pollution controls also increase. However, the mechanism for this regulation cannot be market based. That is, the fact that pollution is external to individual firms implies that any regulation must be done at the collective level.
A key question then is, do societies control pollution, or does it continually grow without bound as income grows? Recent empirical work suggests that, in fact, the output of many pollutants is controlled as income grows (for a discussion of the direct evidence on pollution controls and the level of pollution and international movements of pollution in response to these controls, see Grossman and Krueger (1991) , Low and Yeats (1992) , Lucas, Wheeler and Hettige (1992) and Levinson (1994) ). Although the evidence is sketchy at this time (see Baumol and Oates (1979) for a discussion on this), it supports the view that, after passing through a period of high and increasing pollution, eventually, society takes actions to control these external effects. Several patterns emerge from the data. For some pollutants, the relationship between income and pollution follows an inverted U while for others a 'sideways mirrored' S (i.e., an inverted U followed by a sustained increase) is seen (see World Bank (1993) and Grossman and Krueger (1995) ).
The evidence cited above raises the question of what properties of the politico/economic process that determine environmental policies are essential for pollution to be controlled. Our goal in this paper is to present a simple theoretical model of this process for pollutants that are internal to a given political jurisdiction. To this end, we develop a model of the joint determination of the rate of development of the economy through market interactions and the extent of pollution regulation through collective decision making. We describe the time paths of pollution implied by alternative institutional arrangements and compare these to a planner's allocation. We show that depending on the collective decision making mechanism in place, the time path of pollution can display an inverted U shape, a "sideways mirrored" S, or an increasing (but bounded) level over time. The first two patterns fit well with the empirical evidence described above, while the last one coincides with the findings of the World Bank for some pollutants. In all cases, we show that the level of pollution is bounded along the equilibrium path.
A straightforward extension of the model shows that if the pollution is external to the political jurisdiction being modeled, the level of the pollutant will grow without bound. This suggests that some sort of political mechanism across countries is necessary to control these 'global' pollutants, but that once in place, this control will occur. Here one of the implications of the analysis is that heterogeneity in income levels across countries that are not fully integrated (capital is not mobile) will necessarily imply disagreement about the optimal regulation of global pollutants. Further, the analysis shows that low capital countries would prefer less regulation. This paper also contributes to the literature, being developed in recent years, on both the large differences in levels of income per capita across countries and in their growth rates. The class of models that have been developed covers the spectrum between those that rely on nonconvexities and multiple equilibria as sources of heterogeneity to those that ascribe most of the discrepancies to different policies. This latter category, for the most part, relies on unexplained differences in policies as sources of differences in performance. This paper tries to further our understanding by looking at a model in which policies are endogenously chosen and vary over time (see also Alesina and Rodrik (1994) , Persson and Tabellini (1994) , Ravikumar (1992 and and Krusell, Quadrini and Rios-Rull (1997) ). The motivation for doing this is that endogenous policies can result in non-balanced growth equilibrium paths even for standard convex environments; environments which --under constant policies--would be characterized by balanced growth path equilibria. Thus, policy endogeneity provides an additional source of both heterogeneity and dynamics. In the model described in this paper, the equilibrium under taxation is such that the cross sectional relationship between growth rates of capital and income levels displays an inverted U shape. This theoretical implication, which is consistent with the findings of Easterly (1994) and Dongchul Cho (1995) , provides an alternative interpretation to the standard view that such a relationship must be generated by models of nonconvexities and/or multiple equilibria: it is simply the --hard to predict ex-ante--dynamic behavior induced by collective decision making in an environment in which income effects matter.
Although there is a large literature on the relationship between economic activity and the environment (see Baumol and Oates (1988) for a textbook treatment of the relevant static theory), there are few papers that explicitly model the relationship between growth and environmental degradation. In the endogenous growth literature the recent work by Fisher and van Marrejwijk (1994) and Mohtadi (1994) is closest to our own. Both of these papers model the environment as an additional factor of production and concentrate on the impact of different criteria that a planner might choose to "allocate" this environmental input between households and firms. The key difference is that in our formulation, public policy is endogenously determined. In John, Pecchenino, Schimmelpfennig and Schreft (1994) , the emphasis is on the analysis of the comparative statics properties of steady states of exogenous growth models in which the environment gets degraded by the act of consuming and resources can be used to improve it. Stokey (1995) studies economies in which a central planner chooses the optimal allocation when individuals are infinitely lived. She shows conditions for balanced growth and discusses the relative merits of tax and voucher schemes over direct regulation. She does not address the issue of implementation; that is, she does not study whether the optimal policies she describes can be supported as the equilibrium policies of some collective decision making mechanism.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the basic model, and studies the equilibrium in which individuals vote over pollution taxes. Section 3 more fully describes the 4 dynamic behavior of such an equilibrium. Section 4 studies the case in which individuals vote over minimum quality or environmental standards. Section 5 presents a class of optimal allocations. Section 6 suggests some possible extensions and modifications, and section 7 offers some concluding comments.
The Basic Model with Pollution Taxes
We consider an economy that has available a wide range of productive techniques that differ according to both their costs of production and their environmental effects. The choice, by firms, among techniques is influenced not only by their price but also by restrictions on use imposed by the government. To model this aspect of firm decision making, we adopt the simplifying assumption that the government sets technique specific taxes with the aim of controlling pollution (in section 4, we consider the case in which the government institutes "minimum quality standards"). Interpreted broadly, however, these "environmental taxes" should be viewed as incorporating a wide array of regulations and other forms of control that result in an increase in the effective price of environmentally pernicious techniques.
We will use a growth model with two period lived overlapping generations. An implication of this is that voting decisions are made by individuals with short horizons, thus, the generational structure and the natural voting scheme that we study (more on this later) allow us to capture a realistic feature of actual economies. The use of the OLG formulation places some restrictions on the form that the growth model can take. In particular (see Boldrin (1992) and Jones and Manuelli (1992) ), the simple one sector models of growth that have become popular in recent years do not generate growth without the inclusion of some form of external economy (Romer (1986) ) or learning by doing externality (Stokey (1988 (Stokey ( , 1991 ). Since our objective is to analyze policies, it seems appropriate to use a model in which in the absence of pollution the competitive equilibrium is optimal and displays growth. For this reason, we will use a variation on the two sector model of growth (see Rebelo (1991) and Jones and Manuelli (1992) ). Thus, the supply side of the model is a two sector model with (potentially infinitely many) differentiated capital stocks. We assume that all forms or vintages of capital are perfect substitutes in production while they differ both in terms of cost of production and in how much pollution their use generates. In order to make the problem interesting we consider the case in which environmentally cleaner capital goods are more costly to produce. This framework has the distinct advantage for the study of the relationship between output and pollution that if the generating activity is not productive (or if individuals do not care about pollution), the resulting market allocation is efficient. Thus, we can effectively separate the issues of taxation to control pollution from the benefits of corrective taxes in setups in which there are other sources of inefficiency (e.g., external economies of scale or external learning by doing).
The nature of pollution that we model is local in both the physical and temporal dimensions. We analyze a model in which voter's have full control over all polluting activities.
Because of this, it is probably best to interpret our results as applying to pollution that is local in nature (i.e., restricted to the voting region). In the temporal sense we first consider the case in which the level of pollution produced at time t affects only the members of generation t-1 without any direct generational spillovers. Although there are no direct effects, policy decisions on the part of one generation affect the well being of future generations through their impact on capital accumulation decisions.
We assume that successive generations play a voting game in taxes on polluting activities. At time t, individuals born at t vote on pollution taxes that will be in effect during period t+1. Their realized utility, V (J ,J ,...), is the voter's utility function over consumption and pollution t 1 2 paths evaluated at a competitive equilibrium given the sequence of taxes. The function V could t (potentially) depend on the entire sequence of taxes chosen. We will examine subgame perfect equilibria of this voting game. As is well known, there are typically many equilibria in multiagent voting games. We consider a representative agent model, and simply select the equilibrium that corresponds to the best policy from the perspective of the representative agent. Even with this restriction, in general, very little can be said about the equilibrium outcomes of voting games of this type. Because of this, we will simplify the problem by going to a special OLG formulation. In essence, we will put enough restrictions on preferences and labor endowments so that V depends t only on current and past tax rates. Moreover, for our specification, it will be true that the only way that previously chosen taxes matter for an individual of generation t is through their impact on the capital stock at the beginning of period t. In section 6 we discuss extensions to settings with heterogeneous agents.
To begin, we will describe the economic environment and the competitive equilibrium that results from an arbitrary sequence of taxes. This determines the form of V . We will then analyze t the voting game given this indirect utility function over tax sequences.
Preferences
Consumer preferences are given by, log c + $ log c -u(s ),
where c is consumption in period j of the individual born at time i and s is pollution in period i.
We assume that individuals are endowed with one unit of labor in their first period of life and none in the second. Their endowments of all other goods are zero. Thus, individuals derive disutility from the level of pollution in their second period of life. Given the assumptions about voting, it is possible without changing the basic results to make preferences depend on the level of pollution when young if the separability assumption is maintained. We chose this simpler framework to simplify the presentation. We assume that u is increasing, convex and C , and that 6 suspect not for our results) and it is the independence of the level of saving from the rate of return. This independence implies that when deciding on the level of saving when they are young individuals do not have to take into account the impact of future taxes. This feature of the equilibrium guarantees that, as noted above, only current and past taxes will enter the voter's indirect utility function.
Consumers maximize utility by choosing consumption in each period of their lives taking after tax prices as given and beyond their control. It is standard to show that optimal decisions are completely summarized by a saving function which in this case is given by,
where w is the wage rate at time t and b is the level of savings. The equilibrium determination of w , i , and s depends on the details of the technology t t+1 t+1
and is the focus of the remainder of this section.
Production Side
On the production side we assume that there is one consumption good produced at each date and a (potentially infinite) number of different capital goods. Throughout we assume that there is a large number of firms in each sector that behave competitively. The consumption good is produced using a composite capital good, k , and labor, n , according to the following production ct t function, c = Bk n ,
where k = I k (z)dz, and k (z) is the amount of capital of type z that is used in production of ct 0 ct ct 4 the consumption good. This formulation implies that the different capital goods are perfect substitutes in production and, hence, quality choice will be driven completely by cost considerations. From a formal point of view, we allow firms to choose either finitely or infinitely many qualities of capital by modeling the choice of firms as a measure over z's. Due to the nature of the cost functions that we will use below, it will follow that in equilibrium, only one quality level will be chosen in any period.
To simplify, we consider a situation in which capital is fully malleable. At the beginning of the period the existing stock of capital, k , can be used to produce either capital goods of type z to
An alternative interpretation of this technology is that if a firm wants to use k units of capital operated at 2 c level z, then it has first to rent m(z)k general capital, use (m(z) -1) k producing type z capital, and then --at the 7 be used in the consumption sector or to produce "generic" capital that will be used in the investment sector. Formally, the investment side of the economy can be summarized by (2.2) One interpretation of this formulation is that, at the beginning of time t, capital is split into consumption capital and investment capital. We assume that the production of new capital is linear in the capital goods allocated to the investment sector, x--output of the investment sector is Ax . In this formulation, m(z) is the amount of general capital (i.e., k) that is necessary to produce t one unit of type z capital. We assume that m(z) is increasing in z, convex and that m(0)=1. One implication of this formulation is that type z=0 consumption capital and investment capital can be exchanged one for one. The cost m(z) should be interpreted as a flow, that is, in every period if the firm wants to operate capital of type z, it must spend the "extra" m(z)-1 units of capital necessary to convert general capital into type z capital. The total amount of beginning of the period capital that is devoted to producing "consumption sector" capital is given by the integral I m(z)k (z)dz. Note that if we restricted quality choices to only be z=0, we would have a standard 4 0 ct two sector growth model.
At the end of the period, both the stock of capital that was used in the investment sector --x --and that used in the consumption sector--k --are depreciated at rate *. Thus, capital at time t Firms in the investment sector use general capital to produce capital available for use in the following period. These firms can use only the zero technology. The production function is linear: it uses type zero capital today to produce new (type zero) investment goods available tomorrow.
We assume that pollution --or smoke, which we denote by s--is associated with the use of capital in the consumption sector. More precisely, the total amount of pollution is given by,
where N(z) is the amount of (flow) smoke generated by one unit of capital in the consumption sector operated at cleanliness level z. We assume that N(z) is convex and decreasing so that higher index goods (higher quality) are less polluting, but there is diminishing marginal reduction in the change of pollution per unit of capital.
There are several features of our technology that are worth emphasizing: First, it assumes that there are no "dirty" or "clean" goods per se; instead there are better or worse ways of producing goods. Thus, our emphasis is on the choice of technology and not on the composition of goods. Second, by being explicit about the role of technology in generating smoke, we move one step ahead of the "smoke in the production function" approach. This is important as the reader can check that our model does not easily resemble any reduced form in which smoke enters the production technology. Third, (2.3) implicitly assumes that the capital goods producing industry does not contribute to pollution. This is a rather extreme assumption and can be relaxed. However. in section 6 we discuss why some version of that assumption is necessary. Fourth, our assumption of a decreasing N(z), coupled with an increasing cost of producing "clean" capital goods, m(z), implies that a cleaner technology can be used only at the expense of fewer capital goods produced. Finally, our smoke variable depends on the amount produced today, that is, it is a flow variable (past smoke does not matter). Thus, decisions made by previous generations do not directly affect the amount of smoke breathed by generation t. This is restrictive and we discuss an extension to the case in which pollution is a cumulative or capital like variable in section 6.
We assume that a firm in the consumption sector that buys capital of type z has to pay a tax rate of J (z). In order to fully capture the idea of a tax --as opposed to a highly non-linear t scheme that is analogous to a direct quality choice--we restrict the shape of the function J (z) to t be proportional to the amount of pollution produced, J (z) = J N(z). This implies that the t t representative firm producing consumption solves the following problem, 
Finally, to keep the presentation simple we assume that the tax revenues (from the pollution taxes) are used to provide some good that enters separably in the utility function. We assume that individuals ignore the connection between tax revenues and this good. (Alternatively, we can assume that tax revenue is wasted.) In section 6 we discuss how the results would change under alternative uses of the tax revenue.
Equilibrium
For a given tax sequence {J }, the notion of equilibrium that we use is price taking equilibria. (ii) c is equal to p k ,
(vi) the tax J is chosen, using a majority voting mechanism, by members of the generation t born at t-1.
This definition does not require further elaboration except to point out that when making consumption-saving decisions individuals take as given all taxes, as well as the equilibrium level of pollution. Note, however, that separability of the utility derived from consumption and the disutility associated with pollution guarantees that consumption-saving decisions are made independently of the level of pollution. Thus, there is some myopia that is built into our specification of preferences. It seems reasonable to assume that aggregate pollution should not be a large determinant of individual consumption and this is precisely what our formulation captures.
Since the equilibrium outcome for a given tax sequence {J } is rather standard we relegate t (most of ) its analysis to Appendix A. However, there is one aspect --the optimal choice of cleanliness level, z, as a function of the tax rate--that is both nonstandard and important for our results. Even though it is possible to conduct the analysis at a fairly general level, the basic intuition can be fully captured in a simple setting in which we specialize the functions describing the flow cost of producing high quality goods, m(z), as well as the pollution per unit of capital z, N(z). Specifically, we assume,
From the maximization problem of the firms in the consumption sector, it follows that they will choose the quality z for which the "full operating cost" is lowest (recall that different types of capital are perfect substitutes in production). Thus, any cost minimizing firm will pick z to solve:
Since r is independent of z, this is equivalent to
We summarize the results of this maximization in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. The solution to problem (P.1') is given by z(J) = 0 for J #J , and
Proposition 1 shows that for tax levels that fall short of J there will be no impact on the L equilibrium level of the quality of capital good chosen. Hence, our setting implies a "kink" in the optimal choice of quality: for relatively low tax rates there is no quality upgrade (the optimal z is zero); however, as taxes increase --and they make operation of the dirtier forms of capital more expensive--firms choose to upgrade their capital goods.
Since our objective is to characterize the indirect utility function over taxes, V , we now t describe the equilibrium values of its arguments, with the formal proofs relegated to Appendix A.
What are the factors that determine generation t's preferences over different J ? Recall t+1 that members of generation t vote on the pollution taxes that will be in place at time t+1. In doing so, voters are rational. By this we mean that they understand how taxes will affect all variables of the economy (i.e., they know the equilibrium relationship between taxes and prices and quantities) and, of course, how this affects their individual welfare. Since we have assumed away all heterogeneity within a generation the median voter result applies trivially: the equilibrium tax will be the tax that maximizes the welfare of each member of generation t.
There are two avenues through which taxes affect utility of an individual born at time t. First, consumption in their first period of life is a constant fraction of wages. In appendix A it is shown that wages at t are independent of J . Second, consumption in their second period of life t+1 is equal to the rate of return times saving. But savings --which are just wages minus consumption--do not depend on the taxes they will choose. (It is at this point where our assumption that saving is inelastic with respect to the interest rate becomes quite convenient.) Thus, if higher taxes at time t+1 hurt generation t at all (and this is essential if we are to have a realistic model) it must be because they lower the rate of return between time t and t+1. Finally, on the positive side, higher
11 taxes will both increase the quality of capital goods used in the consumption sector at time t+1 and reduce the quantity of capital allocated to the consumption sector.
How do taxes at time t+1 affect the rate of return? From the definition of equilibrium it follows that Now, at the time of voting, p is fixed, independent of J (see Appendix A). Moreover, kt t+1
optimal behavior on the part of capital goods producers implies r = Ap . Thus,
It+1 kt+1
In this expression, the only element that depends on J is p . Thus, the key channel t+1 kt+1
through which taxes affect consumption of voters is through their impact on the unit price of capital.
If the equilibrium choice of cleanliness level, z, at time t+1 depends just on J (this is t+1 shown in Appendix A) , it follows that total pollution (see (2.3)), is
where we are using the result (see Appendix A for a derivation) that both z and the ratio t+1 k (z )/k depend on just the tax rate that will be chosen at t+1, J . ct+1 t+1 t+1 t+1
To summarize this discussion, it follows that voters' utility function over taxes is given by:
First, note that the effect of J through J on the voter's utility is completely summarized through all of this, it follows that the voter's problem is equivalent to maximizing
where k is taken as given. Note that c (J ;k )=p k . The arguments in Appendix A t+1 t+1 t+1 t+1 kt+1 t+1 t show that p k is of the form p (J )k . Because of our choice of log utility and the kt+1 t+1 k t+1 t +1 " independence of k from J , it follows that the voter's objective function is V(J, k), which is t+1 t+1
given by,
k Thus, to analyze voting outcomes, the two critical pieces of the equilibrium that we need to characterize are the two functions p (J) and µ(J). A full description of these functions is in k Appendix A. However, the result that small tax rates (less than J ) induce no quality upgrade, L while higher tax rates do, implies that both the stationary component of the price of capital, p (J), k and pollution per unit of capital, µ(J), have a kink at J=J .
L
To further describe the two functions, p and µ, it turns out to be convenient to work with k a transformation of the tax rate. As it is clear from our previous discussion, one of the important features of tax rates is where they are relative to the cutoff point, J . Thus, define y = (J/J ) . There are several things to note about the equilibrium prices and quantities as a function of the tax rate. First, the price of capital, p (y), varies with taxes (or in our case the variable y). For k tax rates lower than J (y < 1) the function is decreasing in y. For values of y$1 this function L could be increasing although it eventually decreases. The possibility of an increasing region is 13 interesting because it corresponds to a dominance of a waste effect: as higher qualities are produced and more resources are used up the price of the existing capital can increase. However, for very high levels of taxes, the substantial decrease in the demand for capital in the consumption sector eventually pushes its price downward. At y=1 (i.e. J=J ), p is not differentiable. The L k economic reason for this is simple: for low tax rates ( y<1), the level of the rate does influence the cost of capital in the consumption sector but does not induce any quality upgrades. In this region, firms in the consumption sector choose to use the lowest quality, since it is not efficient to upgrade. As the tax rate gets past the level J , firms not only demand less capital but also choose L to use higher quality capital. Figure 1 shows two possible shapes for p (y). One interesting thing k to note is that in the case in which p has an increasing region, y corresponds to a form of k M monopoly price of capital as a function of y, conditional on the level of y being greater than or equal to one. That is, in the region [1, y ] it is both the case that the value of capital increases and M pollution per unit of capital (µ(y)) decreases.
Second, pollution per unit of total capital, µ(y), is decreasing for all values of y. This function also displays a kink at y=1 corresponding to the quality upgrade. Finally, it is easy to verify that if policies are held constant (i.e. y = y for all t) the equilibrium path is of the balanced t growth variety after just one period. Thus, if this model is to display more interesting dynamic behavior it must be because of the time varying nature of the equilibrium tax rates.
With this investment in notation it is now possible to establish some properties of the equilibrium choice of taxes (or, equivalently, y) as a function of predetermined variables. From (2.4) recall that the indirect utility over taxes V(y,k) is given by,
The outcome of our voting equilibrium is, for each k, the values of taxes --as given by y--that maximize the utility of the median voter. We summarize our results in Proposition 2. What we basically show is that, if a technical condition guaranteeing interiority is satisfied, for small values of k --equivalently a low income per capita country--the equilibrium y is zero. As k increases, y increases, but stays in the region y# 1. These two results simply formalize standard intuition: when income is very low --and consequently consumption is low--the equilibrium choice of pollution tax is zero. As income increases --for higher values of k--the equilibrium level of taxes is positive but falls short of the minimum environmental tax J . This induces a L reallocation of capital between the two sectors but induces no (costly) quality upgrade. Finally, for sufficiently high levels of k, the equilibrium tax is greater than J , and it grows without bound L as a function of k. The transition from the low tax region (y#1) to the high tax region (y$1) is not smooth. Specifically, we show that there exists a level of k, denoted k , such that y(k) is F discontinuous at k . The discontinuity is of a very simple form: y jumps upward at k . We (ii) › k such that for all k $ k , y(k) = y (k) which is strictly increasing, continuous and tax rate induces no change in quality, but does change the composition of output between the consumption and investment sectors.
Even though we assume that u is convex, most of the analysis goes through as long as u is not 'too concave.' In particular, if u=log, the equilibrium tax rate is independent of k and pollution increases monotonically with income and the model converges in one period to a balanced growth path.
Even though Proposition 2 contains the basic result, it is useful to more carefully analyze what kind of time path for taxes and pollution are implied by it. We now turn to that task.
The Dynamics on the Equilibrium Path
It is of interest to analyze what kind of time paths for income and pollution --the variables selected by Grossman and Krueger (1995) --are implied by this model. The previous section showed the nature of the equilibrium as a function of the aggregate capital stock. In Appendix A (see also section 6), we study the implications of the model for the growth rate of capital. Here, it suffices to say that, under standard assumptions (i.e., the productivity in the production of investment goods is sufficiently high) the model displays positive growth for all possible values of the tax variable y. Given this, the time path of capital is simple: it increases without bound. Thus, it is simple to describe the time path of the relevant endogenous variables using Proposition 2. Let ((y) be the growth rate of the capital stock when the tax rate is equal to y (see Section 6 for more details). We collect the main results in the following proposition, Proposition 3: Assume B*, and that ((y) > ((4) > 1 for all y. Then, for a given initial capital k 0 which is assumed small, (i) There is some t such that for 0#t# t :
(a) the equilibrium tax rate y is zero, t (b) the growth rate of capital is constant and equal to ( (0), (c) pollution is increasing. (ii) There is a t > t , such that for all t between t and t : * * * * 1 0 0 1 (a) the equilibrium tax rate is increasing, but y #1, the standard measure of income does not include corrections for quality. At the same time, pollution drops, as cleaner capital goods are used in the consumption sector. The transition from the positive but low tax regime to a regime in which pollution taxes induce quality upgrades is followed by a new regime. In this regime "true" taxes per unit of pollution, as measured by J or y, steadily increase. However, "measured" taxes, defined as the ratio between the sales price m(z)r ,
I
and full price, given by (1+JN(z) )m(z)r , evaluated at the equilibrium z remain constant, and equal I to zero. This follows (see Appendix A) since JN(z) --the equilibrium tax rate per unit of pollution--equals 2/(<-2). Thus, an empirical atheoretical analysis would conclude, as it turns out incorrectly, that environmental taxes do not induce quality upgrades. In this region, both income and pollution grow, although pollution grows at a slower rate. In the long run, pollution is bounded and income is growing and hence pollution, as a fraction of income, disappears. Note that this does not imply that people do not care about pollution. Actually, the opposite is true: at high income levels, voters choose taxes to induce very high quality choices and, hence, they choose to pay a large penalty in terms of cleaning resources relative to output. This is just another example in which a raw analysis of the data would fail to uncover the importance of both voting and market mechanisms.
Does pollution peak at some finite time? There are two candidates for peak pollution. The first is the level at time t --the first time in which pollution taxes are positive--and the second is Figure 3 shows that this very simple model has the ability to capture the inverted U shape relationship between pollution and income at relatively low levels of income. However, it also predicts an upward sloping tail --consistent with some of the Grossman and Krueger (1995) evidence--which could be hard to detect in the data. Overall, it reproduces the sideways S pattern.
Regulating Quality Choice
An alternative institution that can be used to enforce environmental standards are quantitative restrictions. For example, in the U.S. there is a quantitative restriction on the number of leaded gasoline burning car engines that can be sold: it is zero. This type of quantitative restriction is common in many environmental regulations. One way of modeling quantitative restrictions is to allow the voters at time t to collectively choose a minimum level of quality z. In other words, at time t the old vote on a level of quality z and firms cannot use any variety z, with z < z .
of quality exactly equal to z since all forms of capital are perfect substitutes. The market price of t capital will be m(z )r , and firms optimize taking this as given. case in which the collective decision making is over taxes, there is a value of the policy variable --which we denote z --that maximizes the value of capital and, hence, the value of consumption of M the voters --the old. Note that in equilibrium the minimum allowable quality level will be always at least equal to z . It can be easily verified that the function p (z) is decreasing for z$z . In order
to avoid unnecessary notation, we will concentrate on the case z =0.
M
The amount of pollution per unit of total capital is given by,
This function is strictly decreasing for all z's. Thus, the higher the minimum quality level the lower the amount of pollution per unit of output.
In this case, the rate of growth in total capital is given by the appropriate version of (A.7). It is given by, which is decreasing for all z's.
Finally, the relevant voting function for this case is just,
The next proposition summarizes the behavior of the relevant variables under this equilibrium. The behavior of pollution over time (as well as the minimum quality z ) is shown in Figure   t 4. Under this system for collective decision making over environmental problems the economy shows an ever increasing level of pollution. This level grows faster during the initial period in which the minimum quality is given by z . After t the increase in environmental standards M 0 * decreases pollution per unit of output. However, the growth effect dominates resulting in an increasing level of pollution. Finally, this scheme succeeds in controlling pollution even in a growth environment: the asymptotic level of pollution is finite; moreover, it coincides with s --the * J limiting level of pollution under the scheme in which taxes are used to regulate pollution. Thus, although the time paths of the two regimes are quite different, their asymptotic or long run behavior is the same. From a practical point of view this example points out the limitations of using long run or balanced growth arguments to interpret data. In this case, if one were interested in using the evidence to distinguish between the two possible regimes, ignoring the transition phase would be equivalent to giving up the possibility of identifying the correct regime.
A Class of Optimal Allocations
So far we have characterized the time path and the asymptotic behavior of pollution and income in two different equilibrium regimes. In both cases the old at time t vote on either pollution taxes or minimum quality standards to be implemented at t, and the collective decision is made using majority voting. There are several concerns that arise: Are the voters too myopic since they ignore the impact of pollution on other individuals? In general, how do equilibrium levels of pollution compare to optimal levels of pollution?
It is well known that in overlapping generations models it is difficult to fully characterize the class of optimal allocations. However, in order to get an idea of the nature of the optimal pollution paths we consider a simple utilitarian social preference function. Let U be the utility of t generation t, and assume that the planner maximizes (5.1) W = 3 $ U , 4 t t =0 P t subject to the feasibility constraints. The discount factor $ is assumed to be between 0 and 1. The There are some interesting differences between the planner's allocation and the allocations under either one of the two equilibrium regimes (choosing pollution taxes and regulating minimum quality levels). The basic details of the time path of the planner's choices of qualities and level of pollution are reflected in Figure 5 . Note that the equilibrium path of pollution displays the U shape pattern that Grossman and Krueger (1995) emphasize. The planner's allocation is such that pollution converges to a long run level s . This level is * p strictly greater than the long run level in either one of the equilibrium solutions (they are the same). Thus, it follows that the planner's allocation entails strictly more pollution than the equilibrium allocation when minimum quality levels are chosen in the sense that one curve lies strictly above the other. It is more difficult to determine how the planner's solution compares with the equilibrium solution when taxes are the instrument. All that can be said is that for very high levels of capital (and, hence, income) the planner's choice of pollution is higher than the equilibrium. Thus, at least for high levels of income the models predict excessive conservation associated with the equilibrium solutions. The reason why the planner chooses more pollution in the limit is easy to ascertain: it cares about future generations more than voters do. In this setting in which there are no intergenerational spillovers of pollution, voters fail to take into account the impact of the more expensive capital on the welfare of future generations. Note that as the discount factor in the planner's problem is driven to zero all three solutions coincide in the long run.
Why is it that the market solution for a given sequence of minimum standards {z } differs t from the planner's allocation? More precisely, suppose that majority voting would have resulted in a sequence {z } identical to the planner's choice of optimal {z }; even in this case the time path 20 income, and smaller but positive increases at higher levels. This is quite different from the inverted U shape in Figure 5 . The resolution of this puzzle lies in the fact that the solutions to planner's problems like the one we used in this section are in general difficult to decentralize as laissez faire equilibria in overlapping generations models. Typically, it is necessary to implement a sequence of transfers so that the post-transfer equilibrium will implement the planner's allocation. An extreme example of this is the class of one sector endogenous growth models. In those models the planner's problem of the type considered in this section (which of course coincides with the equilibrium in an economy with infinitely lived agents) results in positive growth (under some assumptions on parameters), while it is well known (see Boldrin (1992) and Jones and Manuelli (1992) ) that there is no equilibrium growth in an overlapping generations setting. Thus, the only way in which the planner's solution can be implemented as a competitive equilibrium is with the use of extensive intergenerational transfers. To some extent the same issues cloud the comparison of the time paths of pollution chosen by the planner and those chosen by voters in this setting. However, it is possible to show that even if the planner has a time varying discount factor $ (this pt is in general necessary to replicate the market solution), our asymptotic results about the lower than optimal pollution produced by the market obtain whenever the planner asymptotically gives some value to the future. More precisely, if lim $ /$ > 0, it is still the case that the planner t64 pt pt+1 asymptotically chooses more pollution than either of the equilibrium regimes.
Dynamics and Convergence
Even though our primary focus is on the relationship between pollution, income and growth, the model has implications about the relationship between income levels at t, and the growth rate between t and t+k. This is exactly the kind of relationship that has been the focus of the convergence literature. One position, usually ascribed to the proponents of endogenous growth models (for an early argument see Romer (1986) ), is that, in models that have balanced growth potential, there should be no relation between income level and future growth. An alternative (see, for example, Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) ) emphasizes that exogenous growth models imply conditional convergence, that is, that future growth is negatively correlated with current income level, once other factors are controlled for. The empirical evidence is inconclusive. The studies summarized in Barro and Sala-i-Martin seem to give support to the conditional convergence hypothesis, while Durlauf and Johnson (1995) and Quah (1996) , using a different technique, find convergence clubs, that is, groups of countries that have similar behavior.
To explore the implications of the model for this issue we concentrate on the tax equilibria of sections 3 and 4. Since, we hope that the arguments would apply more generally to other forms of government spending, this seems the most natural setting. From the calculations in Appendix A it follows that the mapping between the tax variable, y, and the growth rate of capital, (, which we indicate by ((y), changes depending on whether the tax rate lies above or below the threshold J (i.e. y is less or greater than one). The function ((y) is
First, it is easy to see that under some parameter restrictions --basically the magnitude of the productivity parameter A--the model displays positive growth, in the sense that for all y, ((y)>1. In addition, it is also possible to obtain that ((0) > lim ((y) >1; that is, high taxes y64 decrease growth --relative to zero taxes--but do not stifle it altogether. In summary, the model is capable of displaying positive growth.
Inspection of ((y) shows that the growth rate of capital is increasing for values of J that fall short of J (y<1), while it is decreasing for values of J>J (y>1). The intuition underlying this L L result is simple: for small values of y (y#1) a tax increase induces a "reallocation effect" as more capital is devoted to investment and less to the production of consumption goods (which is the activity that is taxed). This, of course, increases the growth rate. In the region y$1, the higher level of taxes results in higher quality capital goods being demanded by the consumption sector (in smaller quantities though). Production of cleaner capital goods is a resource using activity and the net result is that the allocation of capital to the investment sector is decreased with the resulting negative effect on the growth rate. An example of the function ((y) is shown in Figure 6 . What does this model say about the relationship between the current level of income and its future growth rate? It turns out that this question is not easy to answer because the growth rate of income depends --in a complicated way--on the changes in tax rates. However, it is relatively simple to describe the relationship between the level of income at time t and the growth rate of total capital between t and t+1 (half a generation in our model). Consider, as before, an economy that starts out at a low level of income (k is low). This economy chooses no pollution taxes (y=0) and the growth rate of capital is given by ((0) in Figure 6 . For a period of time --more precisely between t=0 and t= t --income grows and the growth rate is constant. Thus, in this region the * 0 model resembles the standard balanced growth path implications: growth rates are independent of income levels. However, after t , the equilibrium is such that "low" but positive taxes are chosen * 0 (this is the region in which 0<y <1). Moderate taxation of consumption gives rise to more t investment and a growth boom. The growth rate is increasing in the level of income. A researcher looking at cross country data from countries that lie in this region would conclude that, not only there is not evidence of convergence, but that growth rates (and income levels of course) diverge. Finally, the economy must enter the region in which taxes are high (y >1), a region that is never t left. In this region the higher the initial level of income the lower the subsequent growth rate. Thus, in this region, the model predicts conditional convergence of growth rates of capital.
Even though this is a very simple model and emphasizes only pollution taxes, we suspect that the mechanisms that we describe are relevant in models that emphasize endogenous determination of utility producing publicly provided goods. To the extent that this is a good approximation, it suggests that care must be taken in the interpretation of "convergence" regressions. In particular, the convergence coefficient depends on initial income, and could take any value --including divergence--depending on the mix of countries in the different regions. In addition, models of this type also suggest that it is possible to find "convergence clubs" in the data, without the usual implication associated with those findings. For example, a group of countries with income levels that put them in the region in which the equilibrium tax rate, y , lies t between zero and one, would show divergence, while "rich" countries (those with y strictly t greater than one) would form a convergence club. Finally, the model is consistent with different policies "driving" differences in per capita income and growth across countries. Moreover, the model provides a theory for the differences. Basically, it emphasizes that --at different income levels--countries choose different policies that result in different growth performances.
Extensions
There are some extensions of the model that are straightforward and do not alter the qualitative properties of the results. a) Global External Effects. The model can be easily extended to one in which pollution is global. There, for a small country, the level of pollution is independent of local activities. It is straightforward to show that in this case, no local pollution controls are enacted.
b) Pollution as a stock variable. Throughout the paper we assumed that pollution is a flow: the amount of smoke generated today affects only today's utility. If instead, pollution is treated as a capital stock in which the amount produced at t increases that stock, the analysis in section 2 and 3 remains basically unchanged. In this case, however, the welfare comparisons are more difficult. c) Heterogeneity . The assumption of identical individuals is convenient but not essential. First if different individuals have different amounts of initial wealth --say due to differences in their labor endowment or government transfers--our results in sections 2-4 go through as they are. The key observation is that the relevant voting function even in this case depends on just the amount of pollution and the unit price of capital. If individuals have different disutility from pollution (different u functions) then additional assumptions to guarantee that the median voter theorem holds are necessary. Given those assumptions the analysis proceeds as in sections 2 and 4. Finally, if the young cared about pollution but either cannot vote or are never the median voter, our positive analysis goes through without any changes. However, the normative analysis of section 5 needs to be revised. In particular, the conclusion that the asymptotic level of pollution in the planner's solution exceeds that of the market need no longer hold.
d) The uses of tax revenue. In the analysis of sections 2 and 3 we assumed that the proceeds from the environmental tax are thrown away (or, alternatively, used to finance a public good whose utility is separable with respect to the other variables). There are at least three simple alternatives: use the proceeds to "clean" the environment, make a transfer to the young or to the old. In the first case --and depending on how the cleaning up technology is specified--the qualitative results remain the same. If the tax revenue is used to finance a transfer to the young, it is possible to obtain the puzzling result that higher taxes increase the growth rate. This is a standard result in overlapping generations models (see Boldrin (1992) and Jones and Manuelli (1992) ). Finally, if the proceeds from taxing low quality capital are used to finance a transfer to the old, the problem becomes substantially more complicated: in this case the saving function will depend on the interest rate and hence the voting decision must be modeled as a complicated game with an uncountable number of agents. Even though this is an interesting (and realistic) situation it seems to add a level of complication that is hard to justify.
e) Alternative technologies. In this paper we emphasized the possibility that different capital stocks that are useful in producing consumption also produce pollution. An alternative would be to consider "clean" and "dirty" capital goods that can be used in both sectors. There are problems with these alternative specifications. If there are multiple capital goods in the production sector, it is possible that the voting problem is not well defined. The reason for this is simple: by increasing the price of capital (say through higher taxes) the old increase their consumption while at the same time reducing pollution. In this setting the optimal private tax is infinite. Alternatively, one can consider multiple capital goods in the consumption sector. The problem in this case is that tax increases devote more resources to the capital sector and this increases the growth rate. Therefore, such a model would have the implication that higher pollution taxes are growth enhancing. It seemed that this is at odds with the evidence and, hence, we decided against this model.
Concluding Comments
There are several conclusions that emerge from this analysis. It is possible to separate them into two categories: those specific to the issue of growth and the environment and those that are more general and point to the potential of models of endogenous policy to explain growth facts. i) One of the questions we raised at the beginning of this paper concerned the extent to which individuals acting in their own self interest through collective choice mechanisms have the incentive to control external effects. Even though pollution would converge to infinity in the absence of collective choice, voting mechanisms provide sufficient incentives to bound pollution at the cost of lower growth. The fact that this holds for both of the mechanisms (i.e., voting on taxes and voting on qualities) that we analyze suggests that this result is robust to the details of 24 the collective choice mechanism.
(ii) The models that we analyze display dynamic paths that vary in subtle ways with the details of the institutional structure. For example, even though the limiting level of pollution is the same under both voting on taxes and voting over quality regulation, the time paths followed by both pollution and income are quite different. This finding illustrates a property that is likely to be shared by many models of endogenous policy choice. This is that even though the long run behavior is invariant to the choice of institutions, the qualitative nature of the path that is followed could be quite different.
iii) Our analysis suggests that even in cases in which policy decisions about pollution control are made without consideration of future generations, it does not follow that the equilibrium level of pollution is excessive. In particular, the analysis in sections 2 and 3 suggest exactly the opposite: there are equilibrium allocations that --at least asymptotically--result in too little pollution. This feature of the equilibrium is likely dependent on the fact that, in this formulation, the choices of the voting generation with respect to pollution do not affect future generations. In particular, this will no longer hold if either the young are directly affected by pollution (and they are still not allowed to vote) or if pollution has a stock component to it.
iv) There is a more general point about the relationship between public policy and growth that this paper makes. It shows that by endogeneizing policy choices it is possible to capture some of the stylized facts that seem to characterize cross country growth data. Of course, for this to be the case it is necessary that the equilibrium be of the non-balanced growth variety: it is necessary for policies to change with income levels, which is impossible on a balanced growth path. This paper suggests that models of endogenous policy choices in non-balanced growth environments are tractable and potentially useful to interpret cross country growth data. More specifically, the model implies:
a) In the equilibrium in which individuals vote on taxes, growth rates are constant at very low levels of income. This is followed by a period of increasing growth rates and, finally, by a long run trend for growth rates to coincide. It is quite possible that a convergence regression would yield a positive, negative or zero coefficient on initial income depending on the mix of countries in the three regions. Moreover, our results suggest a possible model consistent with the finding of the existence of "convergence clubs." Specifically, our model implies that there are two convergence clubs: the low income countries and the high income countries. In the case of the latter (we interpret high income as those countries that have entered the last phase) the model implies that in a regression of growth on initial income the coefficient should be negative. Note however, that there are no multiple equilibria. In other words, in this model all countries eventually join the "high income club."
b) The observation that the cross sectional relationship between growth rates and income is an inverted U (see Easterly (1994) and Cho (1995) ) is also consistent with this model.
However, the insight that one gets is quite different from the argument developed by Easterly. This argument relies on minimum consumption levels and decreasing marginal product of capital to induce relatively low savings at both ends of the income spectrum. In our case, it is the endogenous choice of policies that respond to the interest of voters that produces the same inverted U shape pattern in equilibrium.
c)The model also implies that trying to separate the effects of policies from those of initial conditions is fruitless: the two variables are perfectly correlated. In particular --using the voting-over-taxes equilibrium as the basic model--it follows that higher income levels "cause" higher taxes which, in turn, decrease future growth. This endogeneity of policies far from being a theoretical curiosity is probably quite prevalent. This model simply illustrates the danger of giving structural interpretations to reduced forms. Stokey, N.L. (1991 (1 % J t N(z t ))m (z t ) . with equality if new capital is produced.
From Proposition 1 we know that producers of consumption goods will choose, at time t, only one quality of capital which we denote either z , or z(J ), and its expression is given in t t Proposition 1.
For firms in the consumption sector, the rental price of capital (after taxes) must equal the marginal product of capital. That is:
Hence, using the equilibrium condition from the capital producing sector, (A.4) Finally, to close the model we need to specify the equilibrium condition that ties consumer decisions and producer decisions. We do this by imposing the equality of savings with the value of capital taken into period t+1: b = p k . Using the equilibrium condition that the wage rate is t kt t+1
given by the marginal product of labor, it follows that, and w = (1 -")Bk (z ) .
This, in turn, implies,
. Since, m(z )k (z ) + x = k , we can rewrite the law of motion for k as : It follows that the growth rate of capital between time t and t+1 depends on the tax rate chosen at time t. The precise expression is, (A.7) where the dependence of the equilibrium quality level, z , on the tax rate is described in t Proposition 1. Note that (A.5) and (A.7) imply that the equilibrium relationship between the level of capital in the consumption sector, k (z), and the contemporaneous level of aggregate capital, for y $ 1
for y $ 1 31 implied by y is, while pollution per unit of capital in the consumption sector (again as a function of the tax rate) is, With these two functions it is immediate to derive an expression for the after tax cost of capital in the consumption sector. It is given by, .
Using equations (A.5) and (A.6) evaluated at the equilibrium levels of all the variables as functions of the tax rate, y, it is possible to calculate the fraction of the total capital stock allocated to the consumption sector. This fraction is, .
Finally, given the ratio k /k and N, it follows that pollution per unit of total capital and the c unit price of capital as functions of the tax rate y are given by equations (2.6) and (2.7) in the text. The first order condition is,
When J = 0, this is (1 + z) 2 > 0, for all z $ 0. This implies that z(J) = 0 for sufficiently 2!1 small J, since the candidate interior solution yields a greater value of the objective function than the z=0 solution. This candidate solution is a local minimum. Note that, as defined, J satisfies, Next, we state assumption B*. This assumption guarantees that, along any equilibrium, the tax rate for small levels of capital lies in the region (0,J ). Let .(y) be defined by, (1978) and Milgrom and Shannon (1994) show that the maximand y is monotone increasing.
1
A straightforward calculation shows that,
or, equivalently,
where the argument y is omitted when there is no risk of confusion. In this derivation we used the fact that $(p /p )(µ /µ )=., given the specific form of p and µ . Next consider, Note that as defined in Assumption A, k is the smallest k such that y (k) is one. Given the A 1 monotonicity result it is also equal to one for k$k . That k <k is simply guaranteed by A B1 A Assumption A. In Figure 2 we show a candidate y (k) function.
We now characterize the solution, y (k), to the max of V . We need to consider two cases. such that y (k)=1. Using the first order conditions for the maximization of V , one gets,
It is easy to show that V is supermodular as well and hence that y is increasing. Since equality of these two functions is a necessary condition for an interior maximum (y>1) it follows that the maximizer is unique and hence continuous. Two possible y functions --depending 2 on whether y >1 or y =1--are shown in Figure 2 . Simple inspection implies that y (k)64 as M M 2 k64.
We will now prove (iii).
We show that k <k . Direct calculation shows that p (1) k and k and given that the functions p and µ are continuous at 1, it follows that,
Direct calculation shows that µ (1)<µ (1)<0. Thus,
and this implies,
Given the monotonicity of u'(x)x this implies k <k .
C1 B1
The key feature of the functions y in Figure 2 is that they do not intersect. Thus, if for i some values of k the function V equals V while for others V equals V then at the switch points 1 2 there will be a discontinuity in y(k). In particular, if as k increases the optimum switches from V 1 to V , then y(k) will display an upward jump. In Figure 2 such a k is denoted k (the location is 2 F somewhat arbitrary).
To complete the argument we need to show that for low values of k, V >V , while the * * 1 2 opposite holds for large values of k (this is parts (i) and (ii)). First we show that for small k, V >V . Let k#min{k , k }. Then,
Thus, using the fact that p (1)=p (1), we get,
Note that the first term is strictly positive, while the second converges to zero as k goes to zero. This completes the argument that y=y for small k. Define k as the largest such k. Direct calculation shows that 0(y ) is continuous, monotone increasing and satisfies t lim 0(y)=$"/(1+</2). It follows from this equation (as well as from Proposition 2) that y is y64 t increasing (it is increasing in k and k is increasing over time). To show that it goes to 4 suppose t t to the contrary that it converges to some value y*. This generates a contradiction in (P.3.1) as t goes to 4, since the left hand side converges to 0(y*), while the right hand side goes to 4.
To study the behavior of pollution rewrite (P.3.1) as, 0(y ) = u'(s )s .
This statement of the planner's problem assumes that only one quality, z , is chosen at time t. A t more general statement of the problem should allow for measures over z's as the relevant choice variable. Later in the proof we state the problem in this more general framework, and show that the optimum is such that only one quality is chosen at any given time.
The first order conditions for the planner's problem are, For future reference we point out that if z=0 then the relevant version of (P.5.7) is, (P.5.7') 2 8 (1-*+A) m(z ) > < 8 N'(z ). 2t t 3t t Using (P.5.1) , (P.5.2) and the feasibility constraint for the consumption sector, it follows that, (P.5.8) 1 + ($/$ ) = 8 B k . t t P t t Equation (P.5.10) completely summarizes the behavior of pollution in any interior 40 solution. Direct calculation shows that the right hand side of (P.5.10) is decreasing in z . Thus, if t z is increasing in equilibrium (we will show this to be the case), s is decreasing. Taking into t t account that s = N(z ) k , it follows from (P.5.10) that if lim k = 4 (we will show this to be the t t ct t64 ct case as well) then lim z = 4. To show that k 64, suppose to the contrary that it remains in a z64 t ct bounded set. In this case (P.5.10) also implies that z remains in some bounded set. Using (P.5.5) t it follows that 8 is bounded. However, since $ (1-*+A)>1, (P.5.6) implies that 8 64, which 2t P 2t
gives rise to a contradiction. Thus, k 64 and, consequently z 64. ct t
Finally, the limit of the right hand side of (P.5.10) as z64 is ($+$ ) "/(1+</2). Thus, it P follows that s is decreasing (if z >0) and converges to s , where t t p * u'(s )s = ($+$ ) "/(1+</2).
* * p p P
We next show that for k small, the optimal solution is a corner solution with z=0. For this to be the case it is sufficient that (P.5.7') hold. The appropriate version of (P.5.10) is, To complete the proof we show that z is indeed increasing (and in passing we also show t that only one z is chosen at time t). To do this, it is convenient to write the planner's problem as a dynamic problem with the choice variable being a measure, µ, over the space of possible qualities (which we denote Z), with the interpretation that µ({z}) is the amount of capital of type z that the planner allocates to the consumption sector. With this relabeling, the appropriate version of Bellman's equation for the planner's problem is (see Stokey and Lucas (1989) function f is a strictly concave function of µ. Next a direct application of the arguments in Stokey and Lucas (1989) (Theorem 4.8) shows that the value function for the planner's problem, V(k), is strictly concave. This follows because the objective function is strictly concave and the constraint set is convex (in fact linear) in the choice variables. The arguments used by Benveniste and Scheinkman (1979) apply to our problem and establish that V is differentiable when the solution is interior (see the discussion in Stokey and Lucas (1989) Theorems 4.10 and 4.11).
Even though we stated the planner's problem in a general way by allowing measures to be the choice variable, it is easy to see that the optimal measure would be a Dirac measure that puts mass k on the set {z }, where k and z are the variables characterized in the planner's problem at ct t ct t the beginning of the proof. To prove this note that both m(z) and N(z) are convex (N(z) is strictly convex given our assumptions about relevant parameter values), and a direct application of Jensen's inequality establishes that a point mass measure on some z dominates any measure that t puts positive mass on more than one point. Thus, in the planner's problem stated at the beginning of the proof, the assumption that there is a unique z is without loss of generality.
t Finally, to establish that the sequence z is increasing when it is interior (we already t showed that there is a region in which it is zero), rewrite the planner's's problem as, V that the function is supermodular (see Topkis (1979) and Milgrom and Shannon (1994) ) and hence that higher values of k result in higher values of z. However, since the growth rate is positive, the sequence k is increasing. Thus, the sequence z increases as well. 
